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McKELVIE, District Judge. 
 
 In this insurance coverage case, the district court has 
ordered the insureds, their attorneys and their accountants to 
produce documents that would normally be protected from 
disclosure by the attorney client privilege, by the accountant 
client privilege, or as attorney work product.  The documents to 
be produced were created before the insureds purchased coverage, 
 
 
and contain evaluations of the insureds' potential liability to 
consumers of their products. 
 The district court found the information in the documents 
relevant to matters in issue in the action in that it may tend to 
show whether or not the insureds expected or intended the claims 
for which they seek coverage.  The court held the insureds had 
waived any right to maintain confidentiality of these documents 
by filing this action for coverage and by putting in issue the 
matter of their knowledge of facts relating to the claims.  
 The insureds have appealed from that order.  They have also 
filed a petition for a writ of mandamus directing the district 
court to vacate and reverse the order.  The six law firms and the 
accounting firm that have been subpoenaed to produce documents 
have moved to intervene and join in the insureds' requests for 
relief. 
 For the reasons set out below, we will grant the 
petitioners' request for relief and issue a writ of mandamus to 
the district court and direct it to vacate its order that these 




I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 A. The Parties and the Nature of the Proceedings  
 Rhône-Poulenc Rorer Inc. is the successor to the Rorer Group 
Inc.  In the fall of 1985, soon after Pantry Pride, Inc. had 
acquired Revlon, Inc., Rorer entered into an agreement with 
Pantry Pride to purchase Revlon's ethical pharmaceutical 
businesses, including USV and Armour Pharmaceutical Company.  One 
of Armour's products was Factorate, a blood clotting product 
processed by Armour and sold principally for use by hemophiliacs. 
 Rorer formally acquired Armour on January 7, 1986.  On April 
21, 1986, Armour was named in the first of a series of lawsuits 
filed by individuals who claimed Factorate had infected them with 
the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), which is thought to be 
the cause of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS).  To date, 
Armour has been joined as a defendant in more than two hundred 
AIDS-related cases. 
 Rorer had purchased a general liability insurance policy 
from The Home Indemnity Company on December 31, 1985, and looked 
to it for coverage for the claims against Armour.  In addition, 
it sought coverage under a blanket excess policy it purchased 
from Pacific Employers Insurance Company on July 29, 1986.  Home 
denied coverage for these AIDS-related claims.   
  In December of 1988, Rorer and Armour brought this suit in 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania.  In the complaint, they allege they are insureds 
under a primary comprehensive general liability insurance policy 
provided by The Home Indemnity Company.  They contend Home has 
 
 
failed and refused to honor its obligations to defend and 
indemnify them from liability for the AIDS-related claims.  They 
contend the district court has subject matter jurisdiction based 
on diversity of citizenship of the parties under 28 U.S.C. § 
1332.  Rhône-Poulenc and Armour seek, among other things, a 
declaration that Home accepted coverage for these claims.   
 Home answered the complaint by denying that Rhône-Poulenc 
Rorer and Armour are entitled to the relief sought.  In addition, 
it has asserted a number of affirmative defenses and has filed a 
counterclaim for a declaration that it does not owe a duty to 
indemnify or defend the plaintiffs for the claims identified in 
the complaint.  Home has also filed a third party complaint 
against Pantry Pride, Inc., Revlon, Inc. and a number of 
insurance companies, including Pacific Employers Insurance 
Company.  Certain of the third-party defendant insurers have 
filed fourth-party complaints against other insurers.  
 One of Home and Pacific Employers' affirmative defenses is 
that the claims identified in the complaint are excluded from 
coverage because they do not result from "occurrences."  The 
insurers agreed to indemnify and defend against claims relating 
to bodily injury that is caused by an occurrence.  An occurrence 
is defined in the Home policy as "an accident, including 
continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in 
bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended 
from the standpoint of the insureds."  The insurers argue that 
the alleged transmission of HIV from Factorate was known when the 
insurance policies were purchased, that the resulting injuries 
 
 
were not "neither expected nor intended," and that the resulting 
claims are not insured. 
 A second affirmative defense asserted by the insurers is 
that Rorer and Armour wrongfully obtained the coverage by 
intentionally failing to disclose their knowledge of the 
potential for these claims.  A third defense is that Armour sold 
the products knowing that they would create an unreasonable risk 
of harm to others and that the resulting claims are, therefore, 
uninsurable.  
 B. The Discovery Sought by Home and Pacific Employers 
 In connection with these defenses, Home and Pacific 
Employers have sought discovery from the plaintiffs on what 
information they may have had prior to purchasing the policies 
that would have suggested that Armour's products might transmit 
the HIV virus and that Armour would be subject to claims for 
injuries suffered as a result of transmitting that virus.   
 During a September, 1992 deposition, Robert E. Cawthorn, 
Rhône-Poulenc Rorer's chairman and chief executive officer, 
testified to the investigation and analysis undertaken by Rorer 
in connection with its decision to purchase Armour.  Cawthorn 
testified that at the time Rorer was negotiating to purchase 
Armour he and others at Rorer were aware of reports in the press 
that blood products might have transmitted the AIDS virus and had 
sought and obtained advice from counsel with regard to 
liabilities for claims alleging damages for transmitting the 
virus.  He testified: 
 
 
  We had got the advice of outside counsel on 
the potential legal liabilities in this area 
and had learned that blood products are not 
considered in most states as products, per 
se, and are not subject to the same liability 
laws as regular pharmaceutical products.  We 
had learned that there was some precedence 
[sic] in terms of transmission of the 
hepatitis virus which these plasma products 
had transmitted to hemophiliacs.  And that, 
in fact, my recollection is we were told that 
there had been no successful cases against 
the fractionaters [sic] and hepatitis because 
of the particular legal situation.  And the 
opinion was that that should hold, also, for 
the AIDS virus.  
 
  After the deposition, Home and Pacific Employers moved for 
an order extending the time for completion of discovery and 
compelling Rhône-Poulenc and Armour to produce all evaluations of 
their potential liability for AIDS-related claims, including any 
documents confirming the advice described by Cawthorn.  In 
response to the motion, Rhône-Poulenc and Armour produced copies 
of four documents, subject to an agreement with the insurers that 
the production would not waive any privilege with respect to any 
other communication.  
 The first of the four documents produced is the minutes of 
the November 26, 1985, meeting of the Board of Directors of Rorer 
Group Inc.  During this meeting the Board considered the Armour 
acquisition.  Those minutes show that John W. Eckman chaired the 
meeting, and that Cawthorn and Rorer's general counsel, Richard 
H. Lange, were present.  Also present were representatives of the 
accounting firm of Coopers & Lybrand and the investment banking 
firm of First Boston Corporation, as were attorneys from the law 
 
 
firms of Hughes, Hubbard & Reed; Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & 
Flom; and Montgomery, McCracken, Walker & Rhoads.  The following 
summary is included in the minutes: 
  In response to a question by Mr. Eckman concerning 
Armour's product liability exposure, Mr. Lange said 
that Armour's products are not regarded as drug 
products, with associated strict liability, and that it 
has been necessary to prove negligence by the 
manufacturer as a basis for liability.  In addition, 
many states have legislation limiting liability for 
blood products.  There have been only about six to 
eight AIDS contamination suits to date in the industry, 
none of them against Armour.  Revlon has carried an 
umbrella excess liability policy of $60 million, and 
the benefits of a substantial portion of this coverage 
will be available for USV/Armour product claims arising 
during the pre-acquisition period. 
 The second document produced by the insureds is a copy of an 
April 10, 1986, letter from John S. Allee, an attorney with 
Hughes, Hubbard & Reed, to Richard Lange, forwarding to Lange a 
copy of the third document produced, a memorandum by Hughes 
Hubbard titled "Survey of Blood Immunity Statutes and Case Law."  
This survey provides a state-by-state analysis of the law 
applicable to entities engaged in the preparation, distribution 
and use of human blood and blood products. 
 The fourth document is a copy of an April 18, 1986, letter 
from Allee to Lange following up on the April 10 letter and 
suggesting steps Lange should consider as a part of his risk 
assessment and reduction efforts.  In producing a copy of this 
seven page letter, Rhône-Poulenc and Armour redacted 
approximately one half of the typed material on the fifth page 
and the entire sixth page, and reported to the insurers that the 
 
 
deleted material contained very general advice of a legal nature 
as well as Allee's mental impressions.  
 On receiving copies of these documents, Home and Pacific 
Employers continued to pursue their motion to compel, and asked 
the court to enter an order directing the plaintiffs to produce 
all documents in their possession, custody or control relating to 
the 1985 and early 1986 assessments of potential AIDS-related 
claims.  
 In the briefing in support of their motion, the insurers 
argued that these documents would disclose what information the 
insureds had about the AIDS-related claims at the time they 
obtained the coverage, the advice they received on whether those 
claims would be asserted, and their intent or expectation as to 
whether they would become obligated to pay damages as a result of 
those claims.  Home and Pacific Employers argued that this 
information would be relevant to a number of issues in the 
litigation, including whether the AIDS-related claims fell within 
the definition of an "occurrence" under the policy, whether Rorer 
and Armour had sufficient knowledge of the probability of the 
AIDS-related claims so that in obtaining the coverage they had 
breached duties owed the insurers by failing to disclose facts 
relating to the risk that Armour's products transmitted the HIV 
virus, and whether or not the probability of the AIDS-related 
claims was sufficiently clear at the time the insureds obtained 




 Home and Pacific Employers argued that by filing the suit 
and putting these matters in issue, Rhône-Poulenc and Armour had 
waived any right to object to the disclosure of the requested 
documents on the grounds of privilege or work product.  The 
insurers also argued Rhône-Poulenc and Armour had waived any 
protection from disclosure by failing to file timely objections 
to the initial discovery requests seeking the disclosure of these 
documents and by failing to identify them on a list of documents 
being withheld as privileged or as work product.  With regard to 
the redacted portion of the April 18 Hughes Hubbard letter, they 
argued Rorer had disclosed the letter to First Boston after the 
acquisition and thus had waived the privilege.  They further 
argued that by producing a portion of the letter Rhône-Poulenc 
and Armour had waived the privilege as to the balance of the 
contents, including the advice that had been redacted.  
 The insurers asked the district court to enter an order 
compelling Rhône-Poulenc and Armour to produce all evaluations or 
assessments of their potential liability for AIDS-related claims 
arising from Armour's blood products, including those in their 
possession and those in the possession of their present and 
former agents and attorneys.  This request includes documents in 
the possession of the law firms that had advised Rorer in 
connection with the acquisition of Armour: Hughes, Hubbard & 
Reed;  Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom; and Montgomery, 
McCracken, Walker & Rhoads, as well as the accounting firm 
Coopers & Lybrand, and three law firms that have represented 
 
 
Armour in connection with the AIDS-related claims: Morgan, Lewis 
& Bockius; Shanley & Fisher; and Reed Smith Shaw & McClay.  
 C. The Magistrate Judge's Orders Providing for the 
Production of Documents 
 
 The district court referred the motion to a magistrate 
judge.  By an opinion and order dated March 30, 1993, the 
magistrate judge found the advice in the April 18 Hughes Hubbard 
letter relevant to matters in issue in the litigation, including 
whether the underlying claims arose from a fortuitous event or 
circumstance and were not the result of a known loss, and whether 
the injuries giving rise to the claims were not expected or 
intended.  The magistrate judge held that as Rhône-Poulenc and 
Armour had brought the action and had put their own conduct and 
the conduct of their counsel in issue, they had waived any right 
to object to the disclosure of the documents based on the 
attorney client privilege or the work product doctrine. 
 In addition, the magistrate judge noted that a related 
rationale for a finding of waiver is that the selective use of 
privileged information may garble the truth.  In that situation, 
he noted, fairness demands a party be allowed to examine the 
whole picture.  The magistrate judge therefore ordered the 
redacted portions of the April 18 letter produced and scheduled 
further argument on the balance of the documents sought by the 
insurers. 
 The magistrate judge heard further argument from the parties 
on April 13, 1993.  During that argument, counsel for the 
insurers argued that Rhône-Poulenc and Armour had wrongfully 
 
 
failed to disclose the existence of the assessments in response 
to discovery requests.  At the conclusion of the argument, the 
magistrate judge reviewed the basis for his March 30 opinion and 
found that the insurers had sought production of the documents 
long before the end of discovery.  He directed Rhône-Poulenc and 
Armour to produce the liability assessments sought by the 
insurers and also directed counsel for the insurers to prepare 
and submit for approval subpoenas to be delivered to the law 
firms and accounting firm directing them to produce the documents 
sought by the insurers. 
 By letter dated April 20, 1993, counsel for the insurers 
submitted to the magistrate judge copies of proposed subpoenas 
addressed to the six law firms and the accounting firm.  On April 
21 the magistrate judge entered an order approving the subpoenas 
and providing that any objections to the subpoenas must be 
presented to the district court within five days from the date of 
the order.  Thereafter, the insurers' counsel delivered subpoenas 
issued by the Southern District of New York on Hughes Hubbard, 
Skadden Arps, and Coopers & Lybrand at their offices in New York 
City and sought production of the documents at Simpson Thatcher & 
Bartlett's offices in New York on May 3, 1993.  They delivered 
subpoenas issued by the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on 
Morgan Lewis, and Montgomery McCracken at their offices in 
Philadelphia and sought production of the documents at Fox, 
Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel's offices in Philadelphia on May 3, 
1993.  They also delivered subpoenas issued by the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania on Shanley & Fisher at its offices in 
 
 
Morristown, New Jersey and on Reed Smith at its offices in 
Philadelphia and sought production of the documents at White and 
Williams' offices in Philadelphia on May 3, 1993.  The subpoenas 
sought production of the following documents: 
 1.  All documents, including, but not limited to, time 
billing records, that reflect the date of your 
retention by plaintiffs and/or the purpose of your work 
for plaintiffs. 
 
 2.  All documents concerning actual or potential AIDS-
related claims against plaintiffs or against any other 
company or entity which manufactured and/or distributed 
blood products, to the extent that such documents were 
received or created, or are contained in files 
pertaining to, your work for plaintiffs.   
 
 3.  All documents that constitute, were reviewed in 
preparation for, or are contained in files concerning 
actual or potential AIDS-related claims.   
 
 4.  All documents concerning insurance coverage for 
actual or potential AIDS-related claims against 
plaintiffs.   
 
 5.  All documents concerning (i) blood shield statutes; 
(ii) the nature and scope of liability arising from the 
manufacture and/or sale and/or use of blood products 
generally; and (iii) the nature and scope of liability 
arising from the manufacture and/or sale and/or use of 
Armour's blood products in particular.  
 
 6.  All documents concerning information and/or advice 
pertaining to plaintiffs' actual or potential liability 
for AIDS-related claims arising from the manufacture 
and/or sale and/or use of Armour's blood products 
communicated by Rorer or any agent or representative of 
Rorer to persons and/or entities interested in 
acquiring Armour or any of its assets in 1986. 
 
 7.  All documents concerning information and/or advice 
pertaining to plaintiffs' actual or potential liability 
for AIDS-related claims arising from the manufacturer 
and/or sale and/or use of Armour's blood products 
communicated by you or others to Rorer in connection 




 8.  All documents concerning information and/or advice 
pertaining to plaintiffs' actual or potential liability 
for AIDS-related claims arising from the manufacture 
and/or sale and/or use of Armour's blood products 
communicated by Rorer or any agent or representative of 
Rorer to others in connection with the attempted sale 
of Armour in 1986.   
  
 Rhône-Poulenc and Armour did not appeal the March 30 order 
directing them to produce the redacted portion of the April 18 
Hughes Hubbard letter.  They did, however, take an appeal to the 
district court from the magistrate judge's April 13 order, and 
moved to quash the subpoenas.  Skadden Arps and Morgan Lewis also 
moved to quash and the district court granted their motions.  In 
addition, all seven firms served objections to the subpoenas on 
the grounds that they sought documents protected from disclosure 
as privileged and as work product and on the grounds of 
relevance, vagueness and oppressiveness.  The presentation of 
these matters resulted in a clarification of the status of 
certain discovery requests, of Rhône-Poulenc and Armour's 
responses to those requests, and of agreements that had 
apparently been reached by the parties but had not been filed 
with the court.  The rediscovery of this information caused 
counsel for the insurers to abandon the argument that Rhône-
Poulenc and Armour had wrongfully failed to identify these 
documents in discovery or had waived objections to producing them 
by failing to respond to discovery requests or by failing to list 
the documents on a privilege log.  Thereafter, the district court 
found that these procedural matters would not be controlling on 
an appeal from the magistrate judge's order, as it appeared the 
 
 
magistrate judge would have ordered production of the documents 
in any event. 
 D. The District Court's Order Denying Objections to the 
Magistrate Judge's Order and Denying Motions to Quash 
 
 The district court heard argument on the appeal and motions 
to quash on July 28, 1993.  By an opinion and order dated August 
6, 1993, and entered on August 9, the court found: 
  In accordance with [the magistrate judge's] 
findings, this court adjudges the subpoenas 
to pertain to directly relevant information.  
At issue is Plaintiffs' knowledge of the 
liabilities associated with the acquisition 
of Armour.  The issues put into question by 
this lawsuit focus around Plaintiffs' 
knowledge of the underlying claims and when 
they became aware of such claims.  This court 
finds that the documents The Home and PEIC 
seek will aide in disclosing what and when 
Plaintiffs knew of the underlying claims.  
Thus, the information contained in the 
requested documents is directly relevant.  
Therefore, in this instance this court finds 
it necessary to invade the attorney-client 
privilege. 
The district court denied the insureds' objections to the 
magistrate judge's order and the motions to quash, and reinstated 
Skadden Arps and Morgan Lewis' obligations to produce documents 
identified in the subpoenas.  By that decision, the district 
court held: (1) in filing the action for a declaration of 
insurance coverage, Rhône-Poulenc and Armour had put in issue the 
knowledge they had as to potential AIDS-related claims at the 
time they purchased the coverage; (2) by putting their knowledge 
of those matters in issue, they had waived the privilege to 
prevent the disclosure of attorney client and accountant client 
 
 
communications relevant to those matters; and (3) by putting 
their knowledge of these matters in issue, they had also waived 
the protection from disclosure of the work product of their 
attorneys.   
 Plaintiffs, their attorneys and accountants sought 
reargument on that decision and by an order dated October 4, 
1993, the district court denied their motion. 
 E. The Appeal and Petition for a Writ of Mandamus 
 On October 15, 1993, Rhône-Poulenc and Armour filed 
petitions with this court for a stay of the August 6 order and 
for a writ of mandamus directing the district court to vacate and 
reverse the August 6 order.  On October 19, 1993, Rhône-Poulenc 
and Armour filed a notice of appeal from that order and the 
court's order denying the motion for reargument. 
 We have entered orders staying the discovery, consolidating 
the proceedings on the petition and the appeal, and granting the 






 A. Jurisdiction and Scope of Review 
 Rhône-Poulenc and Armour urge us to find that we have 
jurisdiction to hear this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Section 
1291 states that the courts of appeals have jurisdiction over 
appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the 
United States.  Generally, discovery orders are not final and not 
reviewable under this section.  However, under the collateral 
order doctrine a discovery order is appealable where it meets the 
following three criteria: 
 First, the order must conclusively determine the 
disputed question.  Second, the order must resolve an 
important issue completely separate from the merits of 
the action.  Third and finally, the order must be 
effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final 
judgment. 
 
Smith v. BIC Corp., 869 F.2d 194, 198 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 Rhône-Poulenc and Armour argue that each element of this 
test is present here because: (1) the order they appeal from 
conclusively determines that they must disclose privileged 
communications and work product; (2) the order resolves issues 
totally separate from the merits of the case; and (3) the order 
will not be effectively reviewable after judgment, as the 
privilege and confidentiality for the information in the 
documents will be lost when they are produced. 
 In Smith, we held that the public disclosure of trade 
secrets is not effectively reviewable.  A trade secret is 
valuable because it allows a business to obtain an advantage over 
competitors who do not know or use it.  The damage suffered by a 
 
 
business due to public disclosure of trade secrets cannot be 
remedied by an appellate court because the court cannot make the 
information secret again.  Here, however, an appellate court can 
remedy any damage resulting from the erroneous disclosure of 
documents after judgment.  As the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit recently explained: 
 The practical consequences of the district court's 
decision on the controversy between the parties can be 
effectively reviewed on direct appeal following a 
judgment on the merits.  If this court determines that 
privileged documents were wrongly turned over to the 
plaintiffs and were used to the detriment of defendants 
at trial, we can reverse any adverse judgment and 
require a new trial, forbidding any use of the 
improperly disclosed documents.  Plaintiffs would also 
be forbidden to offer at trial any documents, 
witnesses, or other evidence obtained as a consequence 
of their access to privileged documents. 
 
Boughton v. Cotter Corporation, 10 F.3d 746, 749 (10th Cir. 
1993). 
 As the district court's order is effectively reviewable on 
appeal from a final judgment, section 1291 does not give us 
jurisdiction to hear an appeal at this time. 
 Alternatively, the insureds argue that we should decide the 
matter pursuant to our authority to issue a writ of mandamus 
under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), which provides that 
the federal courts may issue all writs "necessary or appropriate 
in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the 
usages and principles of law."  The two prerequisites for the 
issuance of a writ of mandamus are that the petitioners have no 
other adequate means to obtain the relief sought and that they 
have shown that their right to the writ is clear and 
 
 
indisputable.  Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 
96 S.Ct. 2119, 48 L.Ed.2d 725 (1976). 
 Mandamus may properly be used as a means of immediate 
appellate review of orders compelling the disclosure of documents 
and information claimed to be protected from disclosure by 
privilege or other interests in confidentiality.  Haines v. 
Liggett Group Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 89 (3d Cir. 1992); Cipollone v. 
Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1118 (3d Cir. 1986); Sporck 
v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 314, 315 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 
U.S. 903; Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587, 592 (3d Cir. 
1984).  See also, Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Turner & Newall, 
PLC., 964 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1992); In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94 
(2d Cir. 1987).  We find that the petitioners have no other 
adequate means to attain relief from the district court's order 
that compels the disclosure of privileged information and work 
product.  In addition, we find that the district court has 
committed clear errors of law in ordering that information 
disclosed.  The petitioners' right to the writ is, therefore, 
clear and indisputable.  We will exercise mandamus jurisdiction 
to resolve the issues raised by the petitioners. 
 B. Whether Rhône-Poulenc and Armour have Waived the 
Attorney Client Privilege by Filing this Suit to 
Establish Insurance Coverage 
 
 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) provides: 
  Parties may obtain discovery regarding any 
matter, not privileged, which is relevant to 
the subject matter involved in the pending 
action, whether it relates to the claim or 
defense of the party seeking discovery or to 
the claim or defense of any other party, 
including the existence, description, nature, 
 
 
custody, condition, and location of any 
books, documents, or other tangible things 
and the identity and location of persons 
having knowledge of any discoverable matter.  
The information sought need not be admissible 
at the trial if the information sought 
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence. 
 
 Rule 26 thus provides that relevant but privileged matters 
are not discoverable.  As a result, it frequently occurs that a 
party has documents containing information relevant to matters of 
consequence in the action, but does not produce the documents or 
disclose confidential communications, and the information is not 
offered into evidence at trial.  In this case, Home and Pacific 
Employers seek to discover more than just information on what 
facts Rorer and Armour had gathered about potential AIDS-related 
claims before they purchased the policies.  They also seek to 
discover the advice counsel provided to Rorer with regard to the 
legal significance of those facts and documents that identify and 
disclose communications relating to that advice.  Those 
communications and the documents containing those communications 
would normally be protected from disclosure by the attorney 
client privilege. 
 As the claims and defenses in issue in this action arise 
under state law, Federal Rules of Evidence 501 and 1101(c) 
provide that we should apply state law in determining the extent 
and scope of the attorney client privilege.1  The parties and 
                                                 
1  Rule of Evidence 501 reads: 
 




intervenors agree that we should look to the privilege rules of 
the forum state, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, as 
establishing the privilege for the attorney client communications 
in issue in this case.2  No one has argued, however, that there 
are any principles or rules of law as to the attorney client 
privilege unique to Pennsylvania that should control the 
resolution of our decision on these matters.  
 The traditional elements of the attorney client privilege 
that identify communications that may be protected from 
                                                                                                                                                             
 Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the 
United States or provided by Act of Congress or in 
rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to 
statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, 
person, government, State, or political subdivision 
thereof shall be governed by the principles of the 
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of 
the United States in the light of reason and 
experience.  However, in civil actions and proceedings, 
with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to 
which State law supplies the rule of decision, the 
privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or 
political subdivision thereof shall be determined in 
accordance with State law. 
 
Rule of Evidence 1101(c) reads: 
 
 (c)  Rule of privilege. 
 
 The rule with respect to privileges applies at all 
stages of all actions, cases, and proceedings.     
2  Pennsylvania has codified the attorney-client privilege at 42 
Pa.C.S.A. § 5928 (Purdon 1982) as follows: 
 
 In a civil matter counsel shall not be competent or 
permitted to testify to confidential communications 
made to him by his client, nor shall the client be 
compelled to disclose the same, unless in either case 
this privilege is waived upon the trial by the client. 
 
 
disclosure in discovery are: (1) the asserted holder of the 
privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom 
the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, 
or his or her subordinate, and (b) in connection with this 
communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication 
relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his 
client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose 
of securing primarily either (i) an opinion of law or (ii) legal 
services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and (d) 
not for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the 
privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client.  
See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1233 (3d Cir. 
1979) citing United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. 
Supp. 357, 358-59 (D.Mass. 1950); see also, 8 Wigmore, Evidence, 
§ 2292, at 554 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961) (1st ed. 1904). 
  While documents may be protected from disclosure in 
discovery because they contain confidential communications that 
are privileged, that protection may be inapplicable to facts 
incorporated in the communication.  Upjohn Co. v. United States, 
449 U.S. 383, 395-396, 101 S.Ct. 677, 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981). 
  [T]he protection of the privilege extends 
only to communications and not to facts.  A 
fact is one thing and a communication 
concerning that fact is an entirely different 
thing.  The client cannot be compelled to 
answer the question, `What did you say or 
write to the attorney?' but may not refuse to 
disclose any relevant fact within his 
knowledge merely because he incorporated a 
statement of such fact into his communication 




Id. (quoting City of Philadelphia, Pa. v. Westinghouse Elec. 
Corp., 205 F. Supp. 830, 831 (E.D.Pa. 1962)). 
 
 Evidentiary privileges are an exception to the general rule 
that relevant evidence is admissible.  Privileges forbid the 
admission of otherwise relevant evidence when certain interests 
the privileges are thought to protect are regarded as more 
important than the interests served by the resolution of 
litigation based on full disclosure of all relevant facts.  The 
privilege forbidding the discovery and admission of evidence 
relating to communications between attorney and client is 
intended to ensure that a client remains free from apprehension 
that consultations with a legal adviser will be disclosed.  See 
Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470, 9 S.Ct. 125, 32 L.Ed. 488 
(1888).  See Wigmore, § 2290, at 543.  The privilege encourages 
the client to reveal to the lawyer confidences necessary for the 
lawyer to provide advice and representation.  Upjohn Co. v. 
United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389, 101 S.Ct. 677, 682, 66 L.Ed.2d 
584 (1981).  See E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence, § 87, at 314 
(3d ed. 1984).  As the privilege serves the interests of justice, 
it is worthy of maximum legal protection.  Haines v. Liggett 
Group Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 If we intend to serve the interests of justice by 
encouraging consultation with counsel free from the apprehension 
of disclosure, then courts must work to apply the privilege in 
ways that are predictable and certain.  "An uncertain privilege--
or one which purports to be certain, but rests in widely varying 
 
 
applications by the courts--is little better than no privilege."  
In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d at 100. 
 There is authority for the proposition that a party can 
waive the attorney client privilege by asserting claims or 
defenses that put his or her attorney's advice in issue in the 
litigation.  For example, a client may waive the privilege as to 
certain communications with a lawyer by filing a malpractice 
action against the lawyer.  See Wigmore, § 2327, at 638.  A 
defendant may also waive the privilege by asserting reliance on 
the advice of counsel as an affirmative defense.  Chevron Corp. 
v. Pennzoil Co., 974 F.2d 1156 (9th Cir. 1992) (party's claim 
that its tax position was reasonable because it was based on 
advice of counsel puts advice in issue and waives privilege); see 
also, Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. at 470, (client waives 
privilege when she alleges as a defense that she was misled by 
counsel).  See generally, E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 93, 
at 343 (3d ed. 1984).  In an action for patent infringement, 
where a party is accused of acting willfully, and where that 
party asserts as an essential element of its defense that it 
relied upon the advice of counsel, the party waives the privilege 
regarding communications pertaining to that advice.  Mellon v. 
Beecham Group PLC, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1149, 1151 (D.N.J. 1991); see 
also, e.g., W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc. v. Tetratec Corp., 15 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1048, 1051 (E.D.Pa. 1989) (client waived privilege by 
asserting reliance upon advice of counsel as an essential element 
of his defense). 
 
 
 In these cases, the client has made the decision and taken 
the affirmative step in the litigation to place the advice of the 
attorney in issue.  Courts have found that by placing the advice 
in issue, the client has opened to examination facts relating to 
that advice.  Advice is not in issue merely because it is 
relevant, and does not necessarily become in issue merely because 
the attorney's advice might affect the client's state of mind in 
a relevant manner.  The advice of counsel is placed in issue 
where the client asserts a claim or defense, and attempts to 
prove that claim or defense by disclosing or describing an 
attorney client communication.  North River Insurance Company v. 
Philadelphia Reinsurance Corporation, 797 F. Supp. 363, 370 
(D.N.J. 1992); Pittston Company v. Allianz Insurance Co., 143 
F.R.D. 66, 71 (D.N.J. 1992). 
 Thus, in a patent suit, where an infringer is alleged to 
have acted willfully, the advice of the infringer's lawyer may be 
relevant to the question of whether the infringer acted with a 
willful state of mind.  However, the advice of the infringer's 
counsel is not placed in issue, and the privilege is not waived, 
unless the infringer seeks to limit its liability by describing 
that advice and by asserting that he relied on that advice.  When 
the advice of counsel is asserted as a defense by the infringer, 
the patent owner may explore facts that would make it more 
probable than not that the infringer did not rely in good faith 
on that advice, including for example, what the advice was, when 
it was given, whether the alleged infringer's conduct suggests he 
had relied on the advice and whether he had knowledge of facts 
 
 
that would have led him to believe it would not be reasonable to 
rely on that advice.  See, e.g., Underwater Devices Inc. v. 
Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 Finding a waiver of the attorney client privilege when the 
client puts the attorney's advice in issue is consistent with the 
essential elements of the privilege.  That is, in leaving to the 
client the decision whether or not to waive the privilege by 
putting the attorney's advice in issue, we provide certainty that 
the client's confidential communications will not be disclosed 
unless the client takes an affirmative step to waive the 
privilege, and we provide predictability for the client 
concerning the circumstances by which the client will waive that 
privilege.  This certainty and predictability as to the 
circumstances of a waiver encourage clients to consult with 
counsel free from the apprehension that the communications will 
be disclosed without their consent. 
 Some decisions have extended the finding of a waiver of the 
privilege to cases in which the client's state of mind may be in 
issue in the litigation.  These courts have allowed the opposing 
party discovery of confidential attorney client communications in 
order to test the client's contentions.  See, e.g., Byers v. 
Burleson, 100 F.R.D. 436 (D.D.C. 1983); Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 
574 (E.D.Wash. 1975).  These decisions are of dubious validity.  
While the opinions dress up their analysis with a checklist of 
factors, they appear to rest on a conclusion that the information 
sought is relevant and should in fairness be disclosed.  
Relevance is not the standard for determining whether or not 
 
 
evidence should be protected from disclosure as privileged, and 
that remains the case even if one might conclude the facts to be 
disclosed are vital, highly probative, directly relevant or even 
go to the heart of an issue. 
 As the attorney client privilege is intended to assure a 
client that he or she can consult with counsel in confidence, 
finding that confidentiality may be waived depending on the 
relevance of the communication completely undermines the interest 
to be served.  Clients will face the greatest risk of disclosure 
for what may be the most important matters.  Furthermore, because 
the definition of what may be relevant and discoverable from 
those consultations may depend on the facts and circumstances of 
as yet unfiled litigation, the client will have no sense of 
whether the communication may be relevant to some future issue, 
and will have no sense of certainty or assurance that the 
communication will remain confidential.  
 A party does not lose the privilege to protect attorney 
client communications from disclosure in discovery when his or 
her state of mind is put in issue in the action.  While the 
attorney's advice may be relevant to the matters in issue, the 
privilege applies as the interests it is intended to protect are 
still served by confidentiality. 
 It appears that one matter in issue in this case is whether 
or not the insureds knew, before they obtained coverage, that 
Armour's pharmaceutical products were causing the transmission of 
HIV.  Rhône-Poulenc has not waived the attorney client privilege 
by filing this lawsuit or by placing its state of mind in issue.  
 
 
As Rhône-Poulenc and Armour have not interjected the advice of 
counsel as an essential element of a claim in this case, the 
district court erred in affirming the magistrate judge's decision 
and in finding they must disclose documents relating to the AIDS-
related evaluation that would otherwise be protected from 
disclosure by the attorney client privilege.  Accord, Remington 
Arms Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 142 F.R.D. 408 (D.Del. 1992). 
 In summary, we emphasize that our holding is not meant to 
preclude disclosure of the knowledge the insureds possessed at 
the time they obtained coverage.  Facts are discoverable, the 
legal conclusions regarding those facts are not.  A litigant 
cannot shield from discovery the knowledge it possessed by 
claiming it has been communicated to a lawyer; nor can a litigant 
refuse to disclose facts simply because that information came 
from a lawyer.  Rather than separately review each subpoena 
served on the law firms, it should suffice to say that each 
subpoena seeks the production of both privileged and discoverable 
documents.  Because some documents may contain both discoverable 
and privileged information it would be appropriate, if not too 
burdensome, to redact them accordingly.  See Bogosian v. Gulf Oil 
Corp., 738 F.2d 587, 595 (3d Cir. 1984); In re Martin Marietta 
Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 626 (4th Cir. 1988).  On remand the insurers 
may redraft the subpoenas in a manner consistent with this 
opinion. 
 C. Whether Rhône-Poulenc and Armour have Waived the 
Accountant Client Privilege by Filing this Suit to 
Establish Insurance Coverage 
 
 
 In affirming the magistrate judge's decision approving the 
subpoena served on Coopers & Lybrand, the district court did not 
speak to the accountant client privilege recognized under 
Pennsylvania law.3  On remand, the district court should 
determine the applicability of the accountant client privilege, 
and whether that privilege has been waived.  If there has been a 
waiver, the district court should then determine the extent of 
that waiver.  The district court should also examine the other 
objections to the subpoena. 
                                                 
3  Pennsylvania has codified the accountant client privilege at 
63 Pa.C.S.A. § 9.11a (Purdon 1994) as follows: 
 
 Except by permission of the client or person or entity 
engaging him . . . a certified public accountant . . . 
shall not be required to, and shall not voluntarily, 
disclose or divulge information of which he may have 
become possessed relative to and in connection with any 
professional services as a certified public accountant. 
. . .  The information derived from or as the result of 




 D. Whether Rhône-Poulenc and Armour have Waived the 
Attorney Client Privilege by Failing to Object to 
Discovery Requests and by Failing to Serve a Privilege 
Log 
 
 In their motion to compel, Home and Pacific Employers also 
argued that Rhône-Poulenc and Armour had wrongfully failed to 
object to the disclosure of documents in their response to the 
insurers' discovery requests, and had wrongfully failed to serve 
a list identifying the documents they were withholding.  Home and 
Pacific Employers sought an order from the magistrate judge 
finding that by failing to object and to supply a list of 
documents being withheld, Rhône-Poulenc and Armour had waived the 
protection of the attorney client privilege. 
 It appears from the transcript of the April 13, 1993, 
hearing on their motion to compel that the magistrate judge did 
look to the plaintiffs' failure to list privileged documents as a 
basis for granting the insurers' motion to extend the time for 
discovery.  The magistrate judge did not, however, find that the 
insureds' failure to object and to provide a list of privileged 
documents was a waiver of the privilege.  The failure to object 
was not a basis for his decision to order these documents 
produced.   
 As we noted above, in connection with the appeal to the 
district court from the magistrate judge's decision, Home and 
Pacific Employers abandoned this waiver argument after Rhône-
Poulenc put on the record documents that suggest Home had agreed 
to defer the insureds' obligation to respond to certain discovery 
requests.  In their briefing on the petition and this appeal, 
 
 
Home and Pacific Employers have sought to reintroduce this issue 
into the case and have suggested that the magistrate judge and 
district court concluded that a major factor warranting expedited 
disclosure of these documents was the petitioners' concealment of 
the documents.  That argument is neither consistent with the 
facts nor supported by the record.  Therefore, we find that the 
magistrate judge was correct in disregarding the failure to 
object. 
 E. The Extent of Rhône-Poulenc and Armour's Waiver of the 
Attorney Client Privilege by Cawthorn's Testimony and 
the Disclosure of the Hughes Hubbard Correspondence 
 Home and Pacific Employers also argued to the magistrate 
judge that Rhône-Poulenc and Armour had waived the protection of 
the privilege for the AIDS-related evaluation documents when 
Cawthorn testified about the investigation and when Rhône-Poulenc 
produced the First Hughes Hubbard report and all but a portion of 
the second.  The magistrate judge apparently agreed, at least to 
the extent that he found in his March 30, 1993, memorandum 
opinion that in fairness the selective disclosure of privileged 
communications required disclosure of the whole picture and 
ordered the disclosure of the redacted portion of the second 
Hughes Hubbard letter.  Rhône-Poulenc and Armour did not appeal 
that decision to the district court. 
 Neither the magistrate judge nor the district court relied 
on this waiver by disclosure as a basis for granting the 
insurers' motion to compel the production of the documents 
 
 
relating to the AIDS-related evaluation.  As this issue was never 
presented to the district court, we need not address its merits. 
 F. Whether Rhône-Poulenc and Armour have Waived the 
Protection From Disclosure for Their Attorneys' Work 
Product 
 
 There are numerous substantive and procedural errors with 
the subpoenas approved by the magistrate judge.  In granting the 
petitioners the relief they seek and in finding they are not 
obligated to produce the documents identified in the subpoenas, 
we will not address each of these issues.  Two principal matters 
lead us to the conclusion that the subpoenas should not have been 
approved or issued.  First, it appears the magistrate judge and 
the district court's decisions to approve the subpoenas were 
based on their conclusion that Rhône-Poulenc and Armour's 
privilege to protect the disclosure of confidential attorney 
client communications had been waived as the insureds' state of 
mind was in issue in the action.  As noted above, we have 
concluded that these decisions constituted an error of law. 
 Second, it appears the magistrate judge and the district 
court had concluded that a finding that the insureds had waived 
the attorney client privilege necessarily meant they had also 
waived the protection from disclosure for the work product of the 
firms that had represented and advised them.  For a number of 
reasons, one does not lead to the other.  As a factual matter, if 
the state of mind of the insureds is in issue, papers reflecting 
the work product of counsel that were not shared with or 
communicated to the clients are not relevant.  Work product that 
 
 
was not communicated to the client cannot affect the client's 
state of mind.  See Thorn EMI North America, Inc. v. Micron 
Technology, Inc., 837 F. Supp. 616 (D.Del. 1993).  In approving 
the subpoenas and denying the motions to quash, the court failed 
to determine whether the documents sought were relevant to the 
matters in issue or were reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence. 
 More significantly, in ordering the broad range of documents 
produced, the magistrate judge and the district court failed to 
consider that the protection stemming from the work product 
doctrine belongs to the professional, rather than the client, and 
that efforts to obtain disclosure of opinion work product should 
be evaluated with particular care.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); 
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 509, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451 
(1947) ("Not even the most liberal of discovery theories can 
justify unwarranted inquiries into the files and the mental 
impressions of an attorney."); Haines v. Liggett Group Inc., 975 
F.2d at 94 ("This court has accorded an attorney's work product 
almost absolute protection from discovery."); In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings (FMC Corp.), 604. F.2d  798, 801 n. 4 (3d Cir. 1979) 
(right to assert the privilege belongs to the attorney). 
 We find the district court erred in denying the motions to 
quash these subpoenas.  While the subpoenas may identify certain 
documents that are discoverable, as drafted and served they 
appear to seek the production of documents that are protected 
from disclosure as the work product of attorneys or by the 
attorney client privilege. 
 
 
 While Rhône-Poulenc and Armour's disclosure of the Hughes 
Hubbard reports may provide a basis for finding that certain of 
the documents identified by the subpoenas are discoverable, it 
appears that the subpoenas are generally directed to documents 
for which there is no basis for believing there had been or could 
be a waiver by the clients.  
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 We find that the district court erred in affirming the 
magistrate judge's decision finding Rhône-Poulenc and Armour had 
waived the attorney client privilege by putting their state of 
mind in issue, and erred in denying the motions to quash the 
subpoenas served on the law firms.  The district court should 
reconsider its decision not to quash the subpoena served on the 
accounting firm.  We will dismiss the appeal.  We will issue a 
writ of mandamus, and direct the district court to vacate its 
Order of August 6, 1993, and to quash the subpoenas served on the 
law firms.  We will remand the case for further proceedings. 
_________________________________________________________________
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